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time within which an action to impose a constructive trust may be commenced.
Laches may also be a bar.63 The statute begins to run when the grantee breaches
the oral agreement to reconvey, and his wrongful retention is, or should be,
reasonably known to the plaintiff. 64
CONCLUSION
The constructive trust founded upon an abuse of confidence provides equity
with far greater latitude in determining whether or not to intervene than it has
when confronted with constructive trusts based upon actual fraud, duress, or
the other bases of constructive trusts. The elasticity which the court possesses
when deciding whether or not a confidential relationship exists is both the
strength and the weakness of the doctrine. It permits the court to intervene
and prevent injustice in many cases which could not fall within the other
exceptions to the Statute of Frauds. Conversely, a willingness to deem every
association between friends, business acquaintances, or advisors a confidential
relationship could very well result in a resurgence of many of the evils which
the Statute of Frauds has suppressed. The requisite relationship of confidence
should be found, therefore, only in those situations in which it can be said that
there is a degree of trust, confidence, superiority of position, and duty of fair
dealing equivalent to that of the true fiduciary. A restrictive rather than liberal
application of the constructive trust doctrine is to be preferred. A rigid adherence
to the established requirements will still permit protecti6n to the individual in
a proper case without compromising the protection which the Statute of Frauds
provides.
PARODY AND THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
An author who obtains a copyright on a novel, play, song, or other eligible
material is entitled to the exclusive right, for a limited period, to print, reprint,
publish, copy, vend, translate, and dramatize his productions.1 This privilege
also permits him to deliver, perform, exhibit, produce, and reproduce them in
public by any and all means.2 The primary intent behind this protection is not
to reward the copyright owner, but rather to benefit the public.3 As Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes has stated, "The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors."14 The courts, however, have taken a
tions is without support, either in authority, in logic or in policy." Scheuer v. Scheuer,
308 N.Y. 447, 452, 126 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1955).
63. Cooney v. Glynn, 157 Cal. 583, 108 Pac. 506 (1910); Bogert § 472.
64. Cohn v. Goodday, 191 Cal. 615 217 Pac. 756 (1923); Carr v. Craig, 138 Iowa 526,
116 N.W. 720 (1908); Bates v. Bates, 182 Ky. 566, 206 S.W. 800 (1918); Laughlin v.
Laughlin, 291 Mo. 472, 237 S.W. 1024 (1922); Wiseman v. Guernsey, 107 Neb. 647, 187
N.W. 55 (1922).
1. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a)-(b) (1958).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c)-(d) (1958).
3. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
4. Id. at 127.
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broad view of copyright protection in order to give the copyright proprietor
the exclusive right to any lawful use of his property from which he may
reasonably be expected to derive a profit.0
The wording of the copyright statute which entitles the author to reproduce
his works by any and all means would seem to imply that this is an absolute
right which can in no way be infringed. This "absolute" right has been
modified in the United States and in England, however, by the doctrine of
"fair use." Folsom v. Marsh6 established "fair use" as a taking which was
reasonable and customary. Professor Ball defines it as "a privilege in others
than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner by the copyright."17
The circumstances under which "fair use" can arise are varied. Reviews and
criticisms may quote extensively from the work reviewed for purposes of
illustration.8 Liberal copying from previous works is also permitted when
dealing with science and the arts.9 Further applications are found in cases
involving legal digests, statistical yearbooks, directories, gazettes, business
catalogues, and social registers.' °
On the other hand, the doctrine will not extend to a film, play, or novel
which has taken the "entire story line and development of the original with its
expression, points of suspense and build up to climax."' 1
It has been proposed by some writers that parody and burlesque be construed
as liberally as the arts and sciences.' 2 They argue that since parody is a
criticism of some degree, it should be extended the protection of literary review.1'
5. King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924).
6. 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (.No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mlass. 1841).
7. Ball, Copyright and Literary Proper* 260 (1944). Ball has also described "fair
use" in the following terms: "The right of subsequent authors, publishers and the gcneral
public to u-e the works of others to a limited extent has always been uniwrzally recog-
nized as consistent with the object of publication and the policy of encouraging the dis-
semination of knowledge, learning and culture .... " Id. at 259.
S. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D. Cal. 1955)
(dictum), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), afl'd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 356 U.. 43 (1953).
9. Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (dictum).
10. Colliery Engineer Co. v. Ewald, 126 Fed. 343 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 103) (dictum).
11. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 343, 354
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
12. "As a true burlesque is not an imitation but a criticism of an original wort;
ordinarily it cannot be an imitation of or be 'passed off' as the original worl. '" Yankwich,
Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 Can. B. Rev. 1130, 1154 (1955).
"Parody, as criticism, is itself a socially desirable form of artistic creation and hence
worthy of constitutional protection." Note, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 535, L03 (1936).
"[Blurlesque is a form of criticism which inevitably copies Fome of the original worl: in
order to carry out its purpose." The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 147
(195S).
13. It has also been suggested that to apply the doctrine of "fair use" strictly would be
to violate the individual's constitutional right of free expression. See, e gs, The Supreme
Court, 1957 Term, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 147 (1953). "Public criticism is generally acknowl-
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Centuries ago parody was a very real part of the system of literary review.
However, with the evolution of vaudeville and mass entertainment as "big
business," this type of critical review has passed from the scene. Comedians
today are certainly not thought of as literary critics. There would be no justifi-
cation for extending liberal privileges to parody and burlesque while barring
them from other profit-making endeavors.
Within the field of parody and burlesque then, how can we distinguish
between usage which is fair and that which infringes? In 1955, Jack Benny
burlesqued the movie Gaslight.'4 Later that year Sid Caesar did the same with
From Here to Eternity.'5 An injunction was issued against Benny for his
"infringement" of a copyright, while Caesar's skit was pronounced a fair usage.
It is the purpose of this comment to explore the case history of this problem
with the intention of evolving therefrom a workable and practical rule of law.
EARiLy CASE LAW
The first United States case dealing directly with an alleged infringement of
a copyright by parody and burlesque was Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon.'0 Here
the defendant, while imitating the actress Lotta Faust, sang the chorus of a
copyrighted song, "Sammy," which Miss Faust had made famous. Plaintiffs,
the owners of the copyright, brought an action to enjoin defendant from
further performances of this act. In denying the injunction the court held that
what was being represented were the peculiar actions, gestures, and tones of
Miss Faust, and that the chorus of the song was used as a mere vehicle for
carrying along the imitation.17 The court stated that the person imitated and the
copyrighted song were inseparable for purposes of parody, and that textual
reproduction of merely the chorus would not constitute infringement.18 The
court added, however, that good faith was of the essence, and if the mimicry had
been merely an attempt to evade the copyright law, an injunction would
have been granted.' 9
The next case to arise, Green v. Minzensheimer,2 0 was almost identical in its
statement of facts. In this case the defendant used the chorus plus one
verse while mimicking a singer who was also the owner of the copyright.
Citing its previous decision, the court denied the injunction and held that
edged to be a desirable social force and is within the realm of constitutionally protected free
expression. . . .When the allegedly infringing work is a burlesque, it seems that courts
should also consider in the balance the importance of protecting public comment and
criticism." It is true that the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, but it nowhere
states that in the exercise of that right one may pilfer the property of another. In fact, one
has the right to own and enjoy private property without fear of appropriation by another.
14. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
15. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal.
1955).
16. 125 Fed. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
17. Id. at 978.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. 177 Fed. 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
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defendant derived her popularity from her own cleverness, and furthermore,
there was not sufficient infringement by her for an injunction to issue.21
Immediately following this decision, the same court was presented with the
case of Green v. Luby. Again the facts were similar, but here the defendant
sang the entire song. The court held that in order to imitate a singer it is not
necessary to sing the entire song and, to do so, is an infringement of the copy-
right.2 They carefully distinguished this decision from Bloom & Handzin v.
Nixon, where only the chorus had been utilized, and from Green v. Minzcnslci-
ewer, where there had been no musical accompaniment and where much less
than the entire song had been sung.
About this same time, the first case in point arose in England.21 The
defendant had made a motion picture which in some respects resembled a novel
which plaintiff had written. The court, in holding there was no infringement,
found that the incidents of the film to which even remote resemblances to the
novel could be found were exceedingly few in number or importance. Further-
more, the film was a farce which had changed all settings and dialogue. The
court pointed out that to date there were no cases on record in England where
burlesque of a play or novel had ever been held to be an infringement. It
reasoned that this was probably true because: (1) parody is usually the best
possible advertisement of the original and has often made an obscure Vork
famous; and (2) no infringement takes place where a defendant has bestowed
such mental labor upon what he has taken, and has subjected it to such a
revision and alteration as to produce an original result.2 J
This decision was followed in the United States by the case of Hill v. Whalen
& Martell, Inc.2 There plaintiff was the owner of the copyrighted cartoon
characters "Mutt" and "Jeff." Defendant devised two characters called "Nutt"
and "Giff," who looked like, dressed like, and spoke like Mutt and Jeff, and
incorporated them into a show called "In Cartoonland." The court, in granting
an injunction, observed that one test, when applicable, is ordinarily decisive, i.e.,
whether or not the reproduction has materially reduced the demand for the
original.27 It found that in this case the demand for the original was no doubt
reduced by the presentation of defendant's show.-S
With the background of the early parody and burlesque cases established,
attention is now turned to the only two cases of recent vintage.
RECENT CASE LAW
In the case of Loe-w's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,2 plaintiff sought
injunctive relief against defendant to restrain it from further showings of
21. Ibid.
22. 177 Fed. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
23. Id. at 283.
1. Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co., [1916] 1 Ch. 261.
.. Id. at 267-6S.
26. 220 Fed. 359 (S3IX'T.Y. 1914).
27. Id. at 360.
28. Ibid.
29. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.). Cal. 1955).
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the Jack Benny television show in which plaintiff's copyrighted movie, Gas-
light, had been burlesqued. Benny's writers had followed the original script
very closely, at times verbatim, relying primarily on his unique method of
expression and voice inflection for the comedy element. In fact, at the trial,
his attorneys conceded a substantial taking through use of the same or similar
locale, main setting, characters, story points, development, treatment of inci-
dents, sequence of events, points of suspense, climax, and dialogue. They relied
primarily on the theory that parody and burlesque provide an absolute defense
to infringments of copyrights. The court granted the injunction declaring
that parody and burlesque cannot be used as a mere device for selling enter-
tainment through outright copying of another's material.30 The court further
mentioned that where the taking is for commercial gain, as in the case at
bar, the rules will be applied much more strictly.3' Furthermore, the material
was taken by the television industry from the motion picture industry-highly
competitive rivals.32
The issue becomes one of fact in each case with regard to the substantiality
of the taking. If it is determined that the taking was substantial, then an
infringement will exist. Yet, there is nothing wrong with taking an incident, a
character, a theme, or even the bare plot. "That this line between the permis-
sible and the forbidden may be hard to draw does not prevent its application."
This case is consistent then with the reasoning of Green v. Luby.
In the case of Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.,34 the
same court which heard the Benny case decided that the parody and burlesque
by Sid Caesar of From Here to Eternity did not constitute an infringement.
The court reasoned quite logically that in burlesque, the doctrine of "fair use"
must allow a sufficient amount of the original to be taken so that the artist is
able to conjure up the original in the mind of the viewer.33 This is a necessary
step for a successful burlesque. The law permits a more extensive use of
protectible material in the creation of burlesque than in the creation of other
fictional or dramatic works. The skit by Caesar, titled From Here to Obscurity,
was a new, original, and different work as compared with the motion picture and
it possessed a new, original, and different development, treatment, and expres-
sion.
The famous beach scene of the movie became pure slapstick in Caesar's
skit. He made his entrance wearing a bathing suit and a huge truck tube life
preserver. Throughout the scene pails of water were thrown at him from
offstage. The climax of the movie scene came when "Warden" got up the
courage to ask "Karen" whether or not she had had affairs with men at the
base. In the parody, Caesar mustered up enough courage to pop the all
important question, "Did you bring the towel?"
30. Id. at 181.
31. Id. at 176.
32. Id. at 182.
33. Id. at 183, citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
34. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
35. Id. at 354.
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There was no similarity as to theme, characterizations, general story line,
detailed sequence of incidents, dialogue, points of suspense, sub-climax or
climax. Hence, the decision would seem to be consistent with the Benny case
and is a reaffirmation of the old English case of Glyn v. Weston Feature Film
Co.,36 which held that a minor taking, coupled with originality of the taker,
would not constitute infringement.
STATUS OF THE LAW
The cases then have turned on the question of substantiality. The tests as to
what constitutes a substantial taldng have varied, but the issue has remained
the same. With the rapid advancement and acceptance of television as a mass
entertainment medium, we will no doubt see many more such cases. Thus it
would seem that the need for a clear rule as to what constitutes substantiality
is imperative.
The "tests" for substantiality which have been mentioned include: quantity,"-,
quality s intent of the taker,39 degree of accompanying originality,40 degree
to which the demand for the original has been reduced,41 and purpose for
which used.4 In addition to these, there are several other tests which pertain
to infringement of copyright in general. These are whether the taking was for
profit,43 whether the value of the original has decreased 4 (a corollary of
decreased demand), whether that which was taken was valuable in itself, 4
and the ordinary observer test,46 i.e., whether or not the average viewer would
associate the reproduction with the original immediately upon viewing it. Thee
latter tests, while not specifically mentioned as reasons for the decision in any
parody case, were nevertheless discussed in some and were undoubtedly
influential.
The first determination to be made in the analysis of any case is the purpose
of the infringement. There is no question that a rather liberal taing will be
allowed in the arts and sciences.47 This is so in order "'that the world may not
36. [1916] 1 Ch. 261.
37. Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Grcen v. Minzensbelncr, 177
Fed. 236 (C.CS.D.N.Y. 1909).
33. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 343, 353
(SI). Cal. 1955).
39. Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
40. Green v. linzensheimer, 177 Fed. 2S6 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Glyn v. Weston Feature
Film Co., [1916] 1 Ch. 261.
41. Hill v. Whalen S, Martell, 220 Fed. 359 (S.J).N.Y. 1914).
42. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
43. Al. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 293 Fed. 470 (ED.S.C.), aft'd,
2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924).
44. Folsom v. Mlarsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1S41).
45. Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publishing Corp., 31 F. Supp. 317 (S.DN.Y. 1940).
46. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 13-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 29 U.S,
669 (1933); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1924).
47. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 34% 354
(S.D. Cal. 1955); Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys, 131 F. Supp. 165, 175-76
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be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.' "IS
"Arts" in this context is meant to include the classical and cultural arts, not
theatrical parody and burlesque.4 9
Once it is established that the purpose of the infringement is parody and
burlesque, the doctrine of "fair use" is more strictly applied. To determine
whether or not the particular parody in question has exceeded those close
limits, it is necessary then to determine whether any of the previously mentioned
"tests" of substantiality are applicable.
The ordinary observer test can be eliminated at the outset. By the very
definition of parody, an artist must be able to take, at the minimum, enough
to conjure up the original in the mind of the viewer. The bare minimum
required by a successful parody then, would prove fatal to the artist under
such test.
Consideration of the profit purpose of the taking is also inappropriate. The
copyright statute omits the words "for profit" in the subdivisions concerning
dramatic works. Since present in other sections, 1 it is reasonable enough to
conclude that the omission was intentional.5 2
By case law, the degree to which the demand for the original has diminished
is no longer a standard. Under this rule it had been necessary to show damages
by virtue of the loss of demand. In the case of Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,"
however, it was ruled that damages were not necessary for an action to lie. The
rights granted by the statute are absolute and the very interference with them
is an infringement, whether or not damages result. This reasoning, making these
statutory rights absolute, 54 would also appear to abolish the tests of intent of
the taker, reduction in value of the original, and the value of that which was
taken.
(S.D. Cal. 1955); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302,
304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (dictum).
48. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., supra note 47, at 175.
49. Ibid.
50. "To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any
other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work;
to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or
adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or
design for a work of art . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1958).
"To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in public
for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other nondramatic
literary work. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1958).
51. "To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama . . . and
to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method
whatsoever. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1958). "To perform the copyrighted work publicly
for profit if it be a musical composition; and for the purpose of public performance for
profit. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1958).
52. For cases of statutory construction, see generally Hanover Improvement Soc'y., Inc.
v. Gagne, 92 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1937); In re Shear, 139 F. Supp. 217, 220-22 (N.D. Cal.
1956).
53. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
54. Of course this excludes takings protected by the doctrine of "fair use."
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CONCLuSION
It is submitted that the three remaining standards-quantity, quality, and
degree of originality-should form the nucleus of a rule of law governing parody
and burlesque. These three alone are suited to the unique requisites of such
a law. Quality and quantity should be the basis of the first determination in
analyzing a case. If, for example, very few lines of an insignificant nature are
used or, at the other extreme, if the bulk of the better kmown segments of a
production are taken verbatim, there is no need to argue the point of originality.
Undoubtedly, however, most cases would not be decided on the basis of quantity
and quality alone. Where the question is a borderline one, the degree of
originality utilized by the artist becomes very significant. A tating which could
be decided either way on the basis of quantity and quality alone, if tempered
and dominated by the originality of the artist, will be brought under the
protection of the doctrine of "fair use."
In each case then, to determine whether a taldng is substantial, it would be
necessary to compare the two works to see if some isolated event, a small
proportion of the total number of characters, the basic theme, or other such
borrowing has served only as an inspiration or background for the individual
unique talents of the artist. If, on the other hand, an artist attempts to be
successful by using the labors of another in such a manner as to contribute
nothing in the way of originality, this wholesale use-or more properly, misuse
-will most certainly be considered substantial, and hence not entitled to the
protection of "fair use."55
55. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. Iti kS,D. Cal. lG5
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